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Tidyman’s Management Services, Inc. v. Davis: The Duty to Defend Is 
Irrevocable in Montana 
 
Carrie Gibadlo 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Tidyman’s Management Services, Inc. v. Davis,1 (Tidyman’s) 
the Montana Supreme Court neglected to address the underlying issue: 
whether an insurer’s duty to defend is revocable. Although the Court did 
not directly address revocability, the holding requires an insurer to 
provide defense after it acknowledges a duty to defend even if the insurer 
knows of information that undisputedly negates coverage. Therefore, the 
Court indirectly held the duty to defend is irrevocable. The holding is 
consistent with legislative intent.  
 
II. TIDYMAN’S MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. V. DAVIS 
 
A. Facts 
 
 The plaintiff employees filed a complaint in federal court against 
the officers and directors of Tidyman’s, including Michael Davis (Davis) 
and John Maxwell (Maxwell).2 The complaint alleged breach of 
corporate and fiduciary duties for misrepresenting the merit of a merger 
between Tidyman’s and SuperValu.3 The other Tidyman’s officers and 
directors settled their claims.4 National Union Fire Insurance Company 
(National Union) provided defense to Davis and Maxwell in federal court 
until the case was dismissed without prejudice.5  The plaintiffs then filed 
a complaint in state district court against Maxwell and Davis alleging the 
same claims previously filed in federal court.6 When the plaintiffs filed 
the state court claim, Tidyman’s was added as a plaintiff.7  
 
 After the state court litigation commenced, Chartis Claims, Inc. 
(Chartis), which managed claims on behalf of National Union, sent 
Maxwell’s and Davis’s counsel a letter stating National Union would not 
cover their defense because the insurance policy’s “insured v. insured” 
                                         
1
 Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs. Inc. v. Davis, 330 P.3d 1139 (Mont. 2014).  This Case Note will not address 
the Montana Supreme Court’s order to the district court to consider the substantive reasonableness of 
the stipulated settlement nor the Court’s third ruling on the resolution of conflict of law issues where 
an insurance contract does not contain a choice-of-law provision. 
2
 Id. at 1143.  
3
 Id.  
4
 Id.   
5
 Id.  
6
 Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1143.   
7
 Id.  
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exclusion allowed National Union to deny coverage where one party 
insured under a policy sued another party insured under the same policy.8  
Maxwell, Davis, and Tidyman’s were insured by National Union, 
implicating the exclusion.9 Davis’s and Maxwell’s counsel wrote Chartis 
on three occasions to inquire whether National Union would continue to 
provide coverage.10 After the third letter, counsel for Chartis replied and 
denied coverage.11 While waiting for a response, Davis’s counsel filed a 
stipulation agreement alleging National Union wrongfully denied 
defense.12 Before judgment on the stipulation, a National Union 
representative wrote to Maxwell and Davis and advised them that 
National Union would advance defense costs subject to a full reservation 
of rights.13 After receiving the letter from National Union, Maxwell and 
the plaintiffs filed an identical stipulation to the one Davis had moved to 
approve and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment alleging 
National Union breached its duty to defend.14 The district court held that 
National Union breached its duty to defend and granted the plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment and motions to approve stipulations for 
entry of judgment.15 
 
B. Majority Holding 
 
 In a four-to-one majority opinion authored by Justice Mike 
Wheat, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding 
that National Union breached its duty to defend.16 The Court held that 
National Union’s duty to defend was triggered by the federal complaint 
because the plaintiffs alleged facts which were clearly covered under the 
policy.17 The Court noted that National Union acknowledged the policy 
was implicated in federal court by defending the claim.18  Therefore, the 
district court was correct to refuse to analyze coverage under the state 
court complaint.19 The Court held that “all that matters is that National 
Union was on notice that the Policy was potentially implicated.”20 The 
Court reiterated that insurers should defend under a reservation of rights 
and seek a determination of coverage through a declaratory judgment.21 
                                         
8
 Id. at 1143–1144.  
9
 Appellant’s. Br., Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs. Inc. v. Davis, 2013 WL 6048695 at *33 (Mont. Aug. 1, 
2014) (No. DA 13-0228).  
10
 Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1144.  
11
 Id.  
12
 Id 
13
 Id.  
14
 Id. at 1144–1145.  
15
 Id. at 1146. 
16
 Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1150–1151.  
17
 Id.  
18
 Id.  
19
 Id.  
20
 Id. at 1150.  
21
 Id. at 1151.  
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C. Dissenting Opinion 
 
 Justice Laurie McKinnon argued that the Majority contradicted 
precedent by refusing to consider whether the facts alleged in the state 
complaint implicated policy coverage.22 She contended that an insurer 
has a right to deny defense due to policy exclusions and the Court must 
consider the policy before imposing a duty to defend.23  In her opinion, 
by holding the duty to defend hinges on notice rather than the content of 
the notice, the Majority’s analysis expands the duty to defend.24   
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
 Tidyman’s is a case of first impression in the Court with two 
factors distinguishable from precedent: (1) the insurer was notified 
about the allegations of a claim in two complaints, in contrast to one, 
which provided the insurer with additional information; and (2) the 
insurer acknowledged a duty to defend in the federal action but 
attempted to revoke defense prior to litigation in state court. The 
opinion is significant for what the Court indirectly decided: in Montana, 
the duty to defend is irrevocable. The holding expands Montana’s duty 
to defend and confirms the Legislature’s intent to define the duty to 
defend broadly to protect the insured. 
 
A. Tidyman’s Qualifies Precedent in Montana 
 
 Under Montana law, the duty to defend arises when the insurer 
receives notice of a risk covered under a policy by looking at allegations 
of a claim in the complaint.25 In Farmers Union Mutual Insurance v. 
Staples,26 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant co-owned horses and as 
a result was covered under a third-party’s insurance policy.27 The 
insurer denied defense after deciding the defendant was not a co-
owner.28 The Court found that the insurer erred in denying defense 
because ownership was a disputed fact and therefore must be resolved 
in favor of coverage.29 If policy coverage is invoked in the complaint, 
the Court does not analyze disputed facts, but rather it confines the duty 
to defend analysis to the complaint.30 An insurer has a duty to defend 
                                         
22
 Id. at 1158–1159 (McKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
23
 Id.  
24
 Id. at 1160.  
25
 Grindheim v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 F.Supp 794, 798 (D. Mont. 1995).  
26
 90 P.3d 381 (Mont. 2004).  
27
 Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P.3d 381, 383 (Mont. 2004).  
28
 Id. at 384.  
29
 Id. at 385.  
30
 Id. at 386.  
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when facts alleged in the complaint clearly come within coverage of the 
insurance policy.31   
 
 In Tidyman’s, the facts in the federal complaint clearly invoked 
policy coverage, but the insurer had knowledge of undisputed facts that 
negated coverage. Unlike the insurer in Staples that denied defense 
based on factual disputes, National Union denied defense because 
Tidyman’s was added as a plaintiff and invoked the “insured v. insured” 
exclusion. The Court did not find that the facts were disputed.32  
Instead, the Court referred to the facts as irrelevant, because the 
complaint implicated coverage.33 Without evaluating the facts, the Court 
relied upon Staples to confine its analysis to the facts alleged in the 
federal complaint.34 However, the Court failed to acknowledge that 
factual disputes are significantly different than undisputed facts when 
determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend.  
 
 Under Montana law, when the insurer learns of additional, 
undisputed facts, the insurer can use the information to negate or invoke 
coverage.35 If the insurer considers facts outside of the complaint, and 
incorrectly denies coverage, the insurer is estopped from denying 
coverage and becomes liable for costs and judgments.36 Thus, an insurer 
considers facts outside of a complaint at its own risk.37  
 
 In Burns v. Underwriters Adjusting Co.,38 the insured was 
charged with aggravated assault.39 The complaint alleged negligence, 
which implicated the policy; however, the insured recorded a statement 
causing the insurer to believe the altercation was intentional and not 
self-defense.40 Because the acts were not actually negligent, the insured 
was not covered under the policy.41 As a result, the insurer refused 
defense.42 The Court upheld the insurer’s refusal to defend, despite the 
complaint’s implication of the policy, because the undisputed facts in 
the case clearly showed that the policy excluded coverage.43  
 
                                         
31
 Id. 
32
 Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1150. 
33
 Id.  
34
 Id.  
35
 E.g. Burns v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., 765 P.2d 712 (Mont. 1988); Revelation Indus v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 P.3d 919 (Mont. 2009).   
36
 Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1149. 
37
 Id.   
38
 765 P.2d 712 (Mont. 1988). 
39
 Id. at 712.  
40
 Id.  
41
 Id. at 713. 
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. 
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 Conversely, in Revelation Industry v. St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Insurance Company,44 the plaintiff alleged that damages were caused by 
the insured manufacturing defective merchandise; however, a 
subcontractor actually produced the products.45 The insurance policy 
covered subcontractors who produced defective products, but not the 
insured.46 The insurer knew the subcontractor actually manufactured the 
products, yet denied defense.47 The Court held the insurer had a duty to 
defend because, based on the undisputed facts, the policy was clearly 
implicated.48 An insurer cannot ignore known facts which compel 
coverage even if the factual allegations in the complaint do not fall 
under the policy.49   
 
 In Tidyman’s, the majority failed to consider that undisputed 
facts outside of the complaint can be considered to determine 
coverage,50 and therefore undisputed facts are relevant. Under Montana 
Law, the Court only confines its analysis to the complaint when 
additional facts are disputed.51 In Tidyman’s, like in Burns, the insurer 
learned of undisputed facts which negated policy coverage. Like in 
Revelations, the new information learned by the insurer invoked a 
policy exclusion. However, because National Union learned of the 
information after acknowledging a duty to defend, the Court should 
have recognized that Tidyman’s presented a case of first impression.    
 
 Tidyman’s asked the Court if an insurer could rely on additional 
information to deny coverage after already acknowledging a duty to 
defend. The Court failed to directly address this issue. However, by 
holding that National Union had a duty to defend, the Majority requires 
insurers to provide defense even when known facts clearly negate 
coverage if the insurer has previously acknowledged coverage. The 
holding implies that once a duty to defend is acknowledged, additional 
information becomes irrelevant—the duty to defend is irrevocable.  
 
B. Tidyman’s is Consistent with Legislative Intent 
 
 An irrevocable duty to defend in Montana is consistent with the 
legislative intent, which distinguishes an insurer’s duty to defend from 
its obligation to indemnify the insured.52 Under Montana law,  
                                         
44
 206 P.3d 919 (Mont. 2009).  
45
 Id. at 921. 
46
 Id.  
47
 Id.  
48
 Id.  
49
 Id. at 925–926.  
50
 E.g. Burns, 765 P.2d 712; Revelations Indus., 206 P.3d 919. 
51
 E.g. Burns, 765 P.2d 712; Revelations Indus., 206 P.3d 919; Staples, 90 P.3d 381.  
52
 Mont. Code Ann. § 28–11–316. 
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“[t]he person indemnifying is bound, on request of the 
person indemnified, to defend actions or proceedings 
brought against the person indemnified in respect to the 
matters embraced by the indemnity[.] If, after request, 
the person indemnifying neglects to defend the person 
indemnified, a recovery against the person indemnified 
suffered by the  person indemnified in good faith is 
conclusive in favor of the person indemnified against the 
person indemnifying.”53  
 
The Court has consistently interpreted the duty to defend as being 
“distinct from, different from, independent of, and broader than the 
insurer’s promise to pay on behalf the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become obligated to pay[.]”54  The duty to defend seeks to 
preserve “the fundamental protective purpose of an insurance policy and 
the obligation of the insurer to provide a defense.”55 Had National 
Union provided defense in state court, the insurer could have sought a 
declaratory action to relieve them from liability from the cost of 
judgment. They were not estopped from denying liability until revoking 
defense, consistent with the policy interpretation that the duty to defend 
is broader than an insurer’s obligation to pay. Likewise, by holding the 
duty to defend irrevocable, the Court reiterated the message that 
insurers should be prudent before denying coverage and instead seek a 
declaratory action.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 After Tidyman’s, an insurer in Montana can deny coverage only 
if the insurer has not previously acknowledged a duty to defend.  The 
Tidyman’s holding qualifies prior caselaw by holding that an insurer 
loses its ability to use outside knowledge if it has already agreed to 
provide defense.  Although the Majority failed to distinguish Tidyman’s 
from precedent and as a result, artificially confined their analysis, the 
holding is consistent with the legislative intent to interpret the duty to 
defend broadly and protect the insured.  
 
                                         
53
 Id.  
54
 McAlear v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 493 P.2d 331, 335 (Mont. 1972).   
55
 Id. 
